I. INTRODUCTION
I N MANY communication systems the transmitted information can be intercepted easily by a secondary receiver who may be an ally or an enemy. We ask, how can we assist or hinder the secondary receiver? A solution to this problem is given by wiretap channel coding theory [2] - [6] , where it is treated as a distortionless coding problem and the secondary receiver is assumed to be a wiretapper that obtains different information via a wiretap channel or a broadcast channel. On the contrary, in this paper, we treat this as a rate-distortion problem and assume that the secondary receiver can obtain the same information as the regular receiver.
Suppose that there exists a primary communication system (f, +i) (see Fig. l ), where the encoder f maps a source output sequence X E X" into a codeword W at rate R, and the decoder C#Q transforms the codeword W into a reproduction sequence Xi E .&T within a distortion tolerance D, with respect to a distortion measure d,'"): T* x &T + [0, co). Then it is well-known that, if D, is not less than the distortion-rate function D, (R) , distortion D, is achievable. Now we assume that a secondary decoder & can also obtain the encoder output W, and the secondary receiver wants to obtain another reproduction sequence X2 E &l within a distortion tolerance D, with respect to another distortion measure d$"): 3" X .@.. + [0, co). The secondary receiver may be an ally or an enemy. In the former case, the primary system (f, +i) should be designed such that the decoder C& can also attain the smallest D,.
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IEEE Log Number 8822480. However, in the latter case the primary system should be devised such that any decoder C#J~ cannot achieve a small distortion level. If the primary system assists the secondary decoder as a friendly ally, the secondary decoder can attain the minimum distortion given by where %( R, DJ stands for the set of codes (f, C#Q) satisfying both and Ed,("'(X, df(X))) % D,
On the other hand, if the most secure primary system is used, any wiretapper cannot attain a distortion less than
EdJ"'( X, &). (2) If the primary system is not one of these extremes, the secondary receiver can attain a distortion between Dt(R, Dl) and Df(R, Dl) .
It can be easily shown from (1) that &R, DJ equals the inverse function of the ordinary rate-distortion function with two distortion measures, d, and d, [lo] . Hence Dk (R, Dl) is equal to D, (R, Dl) defined by
Ed,( X, 22).
On the other hand, Dy(R, DJ cannot be easily evaluated 001%9448/88/0700-0835$01.00 01988 IEEE   836   IEEE TRANSACTIONS  ON INFORMATION  THEORY, VOL. 34, NO. 4, JULY 1988 since (2) contains both the maximum and minimum operations. In this paper D$'( R, Di) is considered and evaluated. In Section II the precise statement of the problem and main results are presented. The proofs are given in Section III.
As a special case of Fig. 1 , consider the system shown in Fig. 2 , where +x and Gr correspond to +i and & in Fig.  1 , respectively, and X and Y are correlated source outputs. Let d($) and dp) be distortion measures for X and Y, respectively. For this system D," ( R, D,) can be defined in the same way as D2"< R, Dl), i.e., If the primary system (f, +x) attaining Dv ( R, D,) is used, a distortion on the reproduction of the Y sequence less than Dg ( R, D,) cannot be achieved even if the receiver of 2 or wiretappers decode W by any optimum decoder +r. Hence DF (R, D,) represents a kind of capability of keeping the information Y secret from tiiretappers or the receiver of J?.
Yamamoto treats a source coding problem for sources with additional outputs to be kept secret from the receiver or wiretappers in [l] , where the security of the information Y is evaluated by the equivocation (l/n)H(Y]f(XY)). The present paper deals with a similar problem in Section IV, where the security is evaluated by D," ( R, Dx) .
II. FORMAL STATEMENTOFTHE~ROBLEM AND RESULTS
Let X, .??i, and .!& be finite sets, and let the source output sequence { X,}T=i be independent drawings of a random variable (T.v.) X taking values in X. The encoder f and decoders +i, c#+ in Fig 
Letting X = (Xi, X,, . . . , X,), then J!i = +i(f( X)) and X, = &(f(X)). The decoders ,c&, i = 1,2, have their own distortion measure d,: X x Xi + [0, cc) and the average distortion is defined by cpEdj" '(x, qP; 2 Edi( i=1, 2 (8) where Xiik is the kth coordinate of gi.
A code (f, $i) is said to achieve (R, Dl) if (f, $i) satisfies the following equations for any given e > 0 and n sufficiently large:
6,s D,+E.
Furthermore, (R, Dl) is said to be achievable if there exists a code (f, +,) that achieves (R, Dl) . Let (f, +,) be a primary system achieving (R, DJ. For this (f, C#Q) the secondary illegal receiver can attain the distortion min+282. Hence if we use the most secure primary system, it cannot attain a distortion less than D2"< R, DJ defined by
42 :(f,+d E S (R, 4) where S( R, D1) stands for the set of codes (f, +i) achieving (R, DJ. In this paper our main aim is to evaluate @'CR, Q>.
On the analogy of the fact that D:(R, DJ defined by (1) is equal to D, (R, D1) defined by (2), we can define a function as follows:
However, D; ( R, Dl) is not equal to DF (R, Dl) . For a fixed D,, Dy(R, DJ is a nondecreasing function of R from the definition (11). On the other hand, D:(R, DJ is decreasing for larger R, though 02 (R, DJ is nondecreasing for smaller R. This fact can be explained qu$i;atively as follows. For smaller R the conditionA I( X, X,X,) 5 R in (12) spreads the range of the r.v. Xi as R becomes larger. However, for larg$r R the same :ondition spreads the range of the r.v. X, instead of Xi. In particular, for sufficiently large R, 0; (R, Dl) is equal to min 2z Ed,( X, X2) because the condition I( X, Xi&) 5 R vanishes substantially. Now we define another function 0: (R, DJ by
where F is a deterministic function from .&i to .$*. Obviously, 0: (R, D1) is nondecreasing in all R. For these functions we can prove the following theorems.
Theorem 1: 0: (R, DJ is a nondecreasing concave function of (R, Dl It is also worth describing a rate-distortion function given by the inverse function of Dl(R, Dl), say, R+(D1, D,). From (13), we have
We note that R+ (D,, D2) represents the minimum rate necessary to encode X in such a way that the primary decoder can achieve the distortion D,, and any secondary decoder cannot achieve a distortion less than D,.
III. PROOFS A. Proof of Theorem 1
From the definition, 0: (R, Dl) is nondecreasing in both R and D,. Now we prove the concavity, i.e.,
Let the r.v. ii') and iii) achieving D:('R('), Dji'), i =1, 
Since ( 
where the first inequality in (21) follows from the convexity of 1(X, J?i) with respect to p(Qx) [8, p. 501. From (20) - (22), we obtain
B. Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2 can be established from Theorem 1 and the following four lemmas.
Lemma 1: For any achievable (R, Dl) , %'(R, 01) 6 D: (R, 01) . Lemma 2: For any D, such that 0: (R, DJ is strictly increasing with respect to R, and for any R that achieves (27) where R,( Dl) is the ordinary rate-distortion function with respect to the distortion measure d,.
From the lemmas we can prove Theorem 2 as follows. Since 0: (R, Dl) for a fixed D, is nondecreasing and concave in R from Theorem 1, a typical 0: (R, Dl) is sketched in Fig. 3 , where R, = R,(D,) and R, is the minimum R such that 0: (R, Dl) is constant for R > R,. If R, = R,, then 0: (R, Dl) is constant for all achievable R. In this case, D2f (R,, DJ = DF ( R,, Dl) holds from Lemma 4. Furthermore, we can conclude 0: (R, Dl) = D2"< R, Dl) for R 2 R, because 0: (R, Dl) < D2"< R, Dl) contradicts Lemma 1 and 0: (R, Dl) > DF ( R, Dl) contradicts the fact that D2"< R, Dl) is nondecreasing. If R, <: R,, DC (R, Dl) is strictly increasing for R, -c R -c R, while 0: (R, Dl) is constant for R, 5 R. In this case, we obtain D:(R, Dl) = Dy(R, Dl) = D,*(R, Dl) for R,s R -c R, from Lemmas l-4. Furthermore, we can conclude Dl(R, Dl) = DF(R, DJ for R 2 R, from the continuity of 0: (R, Dl) = max Rk, D,k
Next we prove the four lemmas.
Proof of Lemma 1: For an arbitrary achieving (R, Dl) , define the decoder +i where the function Fd") (:&2; --f .@..) attains minimum: 
where inequalities l-5 follow for the following reasons: Assume that F" attains the minimum of the left side of (31). Then for each $i we can assert that CPb)Pcwd2(x~ F0(4)) x 3) the blockwise function F(") is restricted to the bitwise function Fk, k =1,2;. ., n; 4) from theorem 1, D: (R, DJ is a concave function of (R, D,); and 5) from theorem 1, 0: (R, Dl) is a nondecreasing function of (R, DJ. Hence for an arbitrary (f, cpi) achieving (R, Di) , the decoder r# exists that can attain the distortion 6,~ Di+(R, W. If @'CR, 4) > D,+(R, W, a code (f, $4 must exist such that any decoder & cannot attain a distortion less than or equal to DC (R, Di) . However, this contradicts the previous result. Hence DF(R, DJ 5 D; (R 4 Obviously, F* tatisfies the condition that Ed,( X,.F*( kJ> < Ed,( X, F '( Xl)). This contradicts the assumption that F" attains the minimum. Hence (32) holds for each Si. By multiplying both sides of (32) 
where the inequality 1 and equalities 2 and 3 hoid because 1) X1 is restricted by the extra condition !(,X, Xi) = R; 2) the conditions I( X, !i) = R and I( X; X,X,) 6 R means that the r.v.'s X, Xi, X2 form a Markov chain X-Xi -X2; and 3) equality (31) is shown late:. If the r.v. Xi attaining D-j+ (R, DI) satisfies R' A I( Xi; Xi) < R, it can be easily shown from (13) that 0: (R, DI) = 0: (R', DI). This means that if 0: (R, Dl) is strictly increasing in R, the r.v. X1 attaining 0: (R, D2) must satisfy the condition 1(X, Xi) $ R in (13) with equality. Therefore, since D2+ (R, Dl) equals the right side of (30) in such a domain,
It is well-known that, for any given E > 0 and n sufficiently large, this code satisfies (9) and (10). Now assume that X2 n is obtained from W = f(X) by some decoder &, i.e., X2 = &( f(X)). Then 6, = Ed$"'(X, Jf2) = ; jlEd2( X,, &)
we obtain (25).
To complete the proof, we have to show NO. 4, JULY 1988 Let the r.v. (X, XI) achieving Dc( R, DI) be characterized by the probability Pistrjbution p(x, a,) = p(x)p(R,lx), and let the r.v. (XIk, X2,) in (39) be characterized by p,(x,J21x) = p,(R,lx)pk(R21&x).
For these probability distributions, define po (Z,P21x) 
where the last inequality follows from the convexity of 1(X, X1X2) with respect to p(&?,(x) .
Since it is shown later that the inequality z( x; Ji1i20) s I( x; ~10~20) + 6 (43) holds for any E, we have from (9) and (42) 
Therefore, from (11) and (46) Finally, we prove (43). Let TxkI(r) be the set of all c-jointly typical sequences (x, &), and let T(C) be the set of x such that (x, a,) E TZ21(~) for f, = cpr( f (x)). Then the code (f, C&I constructed by the typical sequence technique satisfies Pr{xET(c)} 21-c
and for x E T( l ) and f, = $,( f (x)), ~n(x~Z,lx.t,)-np(x,~~)~<n~ (48) where n(zlz) stands for the number of indices k, 11 k 5 n, such that the k th component of z equals z. For f, = &( f (x)), let A,(x, a,) be the set of x such that the kth component of (x, fJ equals (x, a,). Then we have for po(x, 2,) = po(&lx)p (x) and pk(x, 2,) = ~&%lx)~(x) that Pob, 4)
:xETC(c):A*(X,~~) I
where T'( 6) is the complement of T(C). Since for any x and f, = (pl( f(x)), n(x, &lx, iI) stands for the number of k such that x E A,(x, XII), the following inequalities follow from (47) and (48) 
Hence for any given z > 0 and n sufficiently large, we have
Finally, A (43) is established from the continuity of 1(x; X,X,).
Proof of Lemma 4: We note that for R, = R,(D,), the r.v. XI attaining 0: (R,, DJ 
q+: IM-) GP.
For this system the following problem was treated in [l] . The sequence X must be transmitted within a given distortion tolerance D,. However, the information Y correlated with X must be kept as secret as possible from the receiver or wiretappers. That least rate necessary to achieve the requirement was derived in [l] , where the security of Y was measured by the equivocation function s,A ;H(YIW), w= f(XY) E I,.
Instead of the equivocation c?~,, a distortion 8, can be used as the security measure, which is defined by S,A min 6, OY (60) : p= tJy(f(X, Y)) achieving (D,, D,) and &(Dx) represents the set of codes (f, +,) achieving (R, D,) From (67), I', ( R, D,) represents the minimum achievable distortion of the secondary decoder +y for the most secure primary system (f, (px), and I, ( R, D,) corresponds with the function DF( R, DJ defined by (11). Therefore, it can be easily shown from Theorem 2 that the next theorem holds. The rate-distortion problem has been considered for a communication system with a secondary decoder to be hindered, and the least achievable distortion of the secondary decoder for the most secure primary system has been evaluated. We have also treated the source coding problem for sources with additional outputs to be kept secret from the receiver or wiretappers. These are new problems in rate-distortion theory which seems to be important with respect to the security of information.
